

[redacted]
copy 4 of 9

3 July 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director (Research)

SUBJECT : Status of Deployment, [redacted]

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1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for approval by the Deputy Director (Research) in paragraph 8.

2. As a result of discussions at a USIB meeting on 22 June 1962, we are presently engaged in augmenting our Far East photo reconnaissance capability by establishing a temporary detachment at [redacted] Philippine Islands, for the purpose of conducting overflights of North Viet Nam. Although civilian Agency pilots will be used for overflight operations, the detachment will be composed principally of SAC support personnel, and SAC U-2 aircraft will be utilized.

3. At present, no U-2's have been deployed to [redacted] but two aircraft are now at [redacted] undergoing certain modifications. It is anticipated these aircraft will be ready for movement to the Philippines on or about 13 July.

4. Before deploying the SAC U-2's to [redacted] and committing them to overflight operations, it is suggested that the following considerations be critically weighed:

a. The SAC U-2's are equipped with J-57 engines which limit their performance to a maximum altitude which is approximately 3,000 feet below that of the Agency J-75 equipped aircraft. (In addition to the obvious disadvantage from the risk standpoint, operational problems will be heightened by the fact that in this area the contrail level frequently will extend to altitudes above the maximum capability of the SAC U-2's.)

[redacted]

c. The SAC U-2's are not sterile aircraft from a counter intelligence point of view in that various components and

USAF review(s) completed.

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equipments in the aircraft have standard Air Force inspection plates and markings which would be highly incriminating in the event of mishap. While the more readily accessible of these can be removed without difficulty, to properly sterilize these aircraft for overflight operations would be a time-consuming and expensive undertaking. While in truth there is no such thing as a completely sterile aircraft, the Agency U-2's have undergone a much more effective face lifting on this score than is possible now with the SAC vehicles.

5. Although it is estimated that the Communist air defense capability in North Viet Nam is extremely limited and at present wholly incapable of interfering with U-2 penetrations, there is always the possibility that the Chinese Communists could move in high performance fighters which might provide a limited capability for intercept. In such an instance, the higher performance [redacted] of the Agency U-2's could constitute the margin which would insure survival.

6. It is recognized that in a situation of sufficient gravity, the foregoing considerations might justifiably be subordinated to urgent requirements, and we might have no alternative to using SAC U-2's to supplement our existing capability. However, in light of present requirements and projected frequency of overflights as governed by climatology at this time of year, it appears likely that the three Agency aircraft currently available [redacted] will prove adequate to satisfy our current reconnaissance requirements in North Viet Nam, as well as the China Mainland.

7. This paper does not presume to assess the political expediency, or even desirability, of operating U-2's from the Philippines at a time when our relations with that country are unusually sensitive. The Department of State has explored this aspect of the problem, and concurs in advising the President of the Philippines of the forthcoming deployment.

8. Recommendation: Recommend that a final decision on the deployment and commitment of SAC U-2's to overflight operations be deferred until immediately prior to their scheduled departure [redacted] at which time the decision to deploy should be predicated on:

a. A critical re-assessment of the gravity of the situation in North Viet Nam.

b. A new appraisal of the scope and significance of the build-up opposite [redacted]

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c. Confirmation that assets currently available are inadequate to satisfy the intelligence collection requirements extant at that time.

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JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Acting Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

APPROVED:

/s/

Herbert Scoville

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Deputy Director
(Research)

Let's keep this An Agency matter until the time of decision is at hand. However, DD/I, DD/P should be alerted to provide necessary inputs at that time. (Decision to go has already been made so what we are talking about is a reconsideration.

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